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Executive Compensation Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002
As the economic boom of the 1980s came to a crashing halt and
failing corporations scrambled to secure the kind of exceptional
managerial talent that could salvage their operations, compensation
packages grew and companies began making loans to their top
executives.'
The purpose of such loans varied from relocation
assistance to the funding of stock option exercises.2 In 1999, 22.9% of
public companies offered loans to their employees, a number that has
fluctuated slightly in recent years, but remained steady throughout
the 1990s. 3 One study suggests that during the 1990s, 412 Fortune
1,000 companies made loans to certain executives, an increase from
225 in the 1980s.4 A list of companies engaged in loan-making
includes such notables as Global Crossing,5 Conseco,6 E-Trade,7
Adelphia,8 Kmart, 9 Home Depot,10 Compaq," and Mattel. 2
1. David Dunkel, Keeping Good Employees Happy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar.
21, 1988, at E9; see James F. Peltz & Lisa Girion, Crisisin CorporateAmerica: Bush Spurs
Debate over Loans to Execs; Compensation: FirmsAre Expected to Take a Tougher Stance
on the Corporate Perk in the Wake of the President's Call for Reforms, L.A. TIMES, July
11, 2002, at C1 (documenting the increase in loans to corporate employees during the
1990s); see also Joann S. Lublin, Loan Dangers: Companies Are Having Second Thoughts
About Lending Money to Their Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2001, at R6
(discussing the executive loan programs at various corporations, including AutoZone,
Conseco Inc., Benton Oil & Gas Co., Fruit of the Loom, Mattel, Teligent, Priceline.com,
and others).
2. See Peltz & Girion, supra note 1.
3. See Lublin, supra note 1.
4. Peltz & Girion, supra note 1 (quoting Judy Fischer, managing director of
Executive Compensation Advisory Services, a firm that tracks compensation). Because
private corporations are not sold to the public as securities, they are not subject to the
disclosure requirements. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, c. 404, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000)). Thus, it would
be impossible to calculate the magnitude of corporations making loans. Because many
public corporations failed to disclose these loans, such numbers remain illusive. See
Lublin, supra note 1 (discussing several corporations that made loans without disclosing
the practice to shareholders).
5. John Legere, the former CEO of Global Crossings, received a $15 million interestfree loan as an incentive to leave his prior position with Dell Computer Corp. Joann S.
Lublin, As Their Companies Crumbled, Some CEOs Got Big-Money Pay-outs-Lucent,
Kmart, Enron, Others Forgave Loans, Gave Stock and Paid Lavish Severance, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 2002, at B1. Only seventeen days before the company filed for bankruptcy, $10
million of the balance was forgiven. Id. See generally Jim Hopkins, $250 Million Global
Deal Means CEO, Creditors Get Less, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2002, at B3 (discussing the
financial circumstances of Global's decision to file for bankruptcy protection).

2116

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Companies' practice of granting loans soon precipitated abuse.
One of the most blatant abuses of corporate loans was perpetrated by
former Tyco Chairman and CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski. 3 In fact,
Tyco has now filed suit against Kozlowski, alleging, among other
things, that he used corporate money and assets for personal uses. 4
Examples of Kozlowski's unethical behavior include borrowing $7
million interest-free to buy a Park Avenue apartment from Tyco 5
and taking more than 200 loans totaling in excess of $274 million
between 1997 and 2002 from the Key Employee Loan Program. 6
David Myers, former controller of WorldCom, pled guilty to
securities fraud charges in September 2002, "in what became the
6. Stephen Hilbert, the former CEO of Conseco, currently owes $201 million in
loans and loan guarantees at the market rate of interest. Joann S. Lublin, Questioningthe
Books: The President Speaks: Loans to Corporate Officers Unlikely to End Soon, WALL
ST. J., July 10, 2002, at A8.
7. Christos Cotsakos, the CEO of E-Trade, received a $15 million loan, which was
later forgiven. Lublin, supra note 6.
8. Former CEO John Rigas received a $3.1 billion loan, which Adelphia guaranteed.
Ex-Exec at Adelphia Pleads Guilty; Accounting Director Enters Plea to One Count of
Securities Fraud and One Count of Conspiracy and Implicates Member of the Founder's
Family, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at C3. The company is now in bankruptcy proceedings.
Peltz & Girion, supra note 1.
9. Judith Schoolman, K-Mart Reinventing Itself: Forging Post-Bankruptcy Plan as
Probes Continue, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 3, 2003, at 57 (discussing the post-bankruptcy
investigation into the company's mismanagement). The bankrupt company forgave $5
million in loans it had extended to former CEO Charles C. Conaway. Id.
10. Home Depot Inc: CEO Nardelli Got $42 Million Package, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19,
2003, at 2. CEO Robert Nardelli has a $10 million loan that is being forgiven over five
years.
11. Id. Compaq forgave CEO Michael Capellas's $5 million loan. Id. Compaq is also
now providing him with a new loan to pay the tax bill on the earlier loan. Wallowing in
Wages, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6,2002, at 66.
12. Peltz & Girion, supra note 1. Mattel lent former CEO Jill Barad $8.5 million at
0% interest. Id. The company has now forgiven the loan. Id. The loan began as a $5
million loan to buy a house. Business Center (CNBC television broadcast, Sept. 9, 2002).
The additional $3 million was for the taxes on the original loan. Id. In fact, there are
contradictory accounts of just how much money Ms. Barad received. See Lublin, supra
note 1.
13. Press Release, Canada NewsWire, Tyco Files Suit Against Former Chairman and
CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski for Misappropriating Money and Assets from the Company
(Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Kozlowski's actions were
particularly egregious because of the amount of money involved and the number of
instances of abuse. See infra note 16. Both of these factors demonstrate a complete
disregard for the shareholders of the corporation.
14. See Press Release, Canada NewsWire, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id. Some other examples of Kozlowski's lavishness include a $700,000 investment
in the movie "Endurance," a $1 million birthday party for his wife in Italy, and a second
Fifth Avenue apartment, which the company bought for $16.8 million, improved for $3
million, and furnished for an additional $11 million. Id.
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largest corporate scandal in American history. 1 7 On January 28,
2002, Global Crossing, a telecommunications company, filed for
bankruptcy
under suspicious
circumstances,
prompting
a
18
congressional investigation. Even cultural icons like Martha Stewart
were not immune: Stewart was the subject of a Congressional inquiry
for the suspect sale of Imclone stock.19
In July 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 20 in an
attempt to remedy corporate abuses.2 ' With this legislation, Congress
intended to calm a volatile market, inspire investor confidence, and
stop the flood of corporate scandals. 22 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act bars
corporations from making personal loans to executives and
directors.2 3 It has negative implications, however, for both executive
compensation and corporate functions that Congress neither intended
nor sought. Congress, in the rush to pass popular legislation, did not
take the time to carefully consider the language of the statute, and in
its haste, used overly broad language that accomplishes more than its
stated objectives.
As a regrettable consequence, executive
compensation, such as the cashless exercise of stock options and splitdollar life insurance policies, must be curtailed. Until the Securities
and Exchange Commission issues its interpretations on such subjects,
17. Associated Press, Former Controller of WorldCom Pleads Guilty to Fraud
Charges,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at C2.
18. Reuters, Congress to Hear from Global Crossing Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2002, at A17.
19. Constance L. Hayes & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Stewart Inquiry Is Said to Focus on
Words Used, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at Cl. Stewart's stock sale is not related to
section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but illustrates the scope of corporate scandals of
the time.
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West Supp. 2003)).
21. David S. Hilzenrath & Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Curb Insider Lending;
Provision Targets Terms That Companies Set for Directors, Executives, WASH. POST., July
13, 2002, at A13.
Other provisions of the Act require increased disclosure by
management, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7261 (West Supp. 2003), increased disclosure by lawyers, id.
§ 7245, establishment of an independent audit committee, id. § 7211, a forfeiture of certain
executive bonuses for noncompliance, id. § 7243, and increased penalties for violation
compared to those of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78ff.
22. STAFF OF JOINT CONF. COMM., 107TH CONG., CONF. REPORT ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY LEGISLATION (2002) (bemoaning the lack of investor confidence); Mike

Allen, Bush Took Oil Firm's Loans as Director; Practice Would Be Banned in President's
New Corporate Abuse Policy, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at Al (stating that these loan
making practices have been one of the reasons for decreased investor confidence in the
United States market); Press Release, Federal Document Clearing House, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (July 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining that this
legislation would help corporate America).
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 402, 116 Stat. at 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m
(West Supp. 2003).
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the Act's imprecise drafting will keep corporate lawyers busy and
have corporations around the world taking potentially unnecessary
precautions, including complete avoidance of certain forms of
executive compensation.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not the first piece of legislation to
make sweeping changes in corporate policy.
The controlling
corporate regulations prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most
importantly the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, were ill-equipped to remedy the troubled corporate
environment. The Securities Act of 1933, the first federal legislation
of its type, contained broad requirements for public offerings of
stock.24 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted during the
Depression for the purpose of regulating securities traded on
exchanges and over-the-counter markets, "including transactions by
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require
appropriate reports to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a national
system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and
the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto . "..."25
The
securities acts as amended have provided corporate guidance for the
better part of a century; indeed, they continue to regulate America's
ever-growing securities industry.2 6
Neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, however, regulated loans from corporations to officers
and directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is extensive legislation
cosponsored by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael
Oxley in an effort to curb the ailments of the corporate world
including those created by corporate loans to executives.2
The
corporate environment that spawned this legislation was one of
investor mistrust and political leaders calling for reform.2 8 In a lastminute adjustment, Senator Charles Schumer changed the Act's
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000).

See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L.
CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (6th ed. 2002)
(summarizing the Securities Act of 1933).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
26. This is not to say that there have only been three pieces of securities legislation in
the last century. HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 24, at 7-8 (summarizing other examples
of such legislation, including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 (2000), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb. (West Supp.
2003), and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111.
RATNER,

SECURITIES

REGULATION:

(2000)).
27. Press Release, Federal Document Clearing House, supra note 22.
28. Hilzenrath & Dewar, supra note 21; see also supra notes 5-19 and accompanying
text (discussing the business environment of the time).
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merely disclose

all loans to a

prohibition on loans from public corporations to their executive
officers and directors.29 Section 402 of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer,. ...

directly or indirectly,

including through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain
credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an
extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for
any director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of
that issuer.30
Notwithstanding the small exceptions built into the legislation,
such as the grandfather clause and the exclusion of loans made by an
insured depository institution,3 1 the language is straightforward on its
face. Currently, the broad scope of the language allows it to impact
large portions of executive compensation packages and corporate
habits that should remain untouched.
The statute evinces the intent of the President and members of
Congress to restore investors' confidence. 2 In July 2002, the White
House released a statement saying that "egregious acts occur when
CEOs treat public companies as their personal banks. Loans of any
type to corporate officers are rarely warranted. The President calls
on ...public companies to end the practice of allowing corporate
29. Hilzenrath & Dewar, supra note 21. The Act includes a few exceptions to this
rule, such as grandfathering provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 402(k)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West Supp. 2003), and
an exception for those issuers insured by FDIC, § 402(k)(3), 116 Stat. at 787 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(3)).
30. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
31. Id. § 78m.
32. See generally STAFF OF JOINT CONF. COMM., 107TH CONG., CONF. REPORT ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

LEGISLATION

(2002)

("This

legislation

reflects our

determination to see that the confidence of investors in our capital markets is restored.");
Allen, supra note 22 (explaining the President's belief "that the government should draw a
bright line concerning loans going forward"); Legislative Update, THE AMERICAN
BANKER, Aug. 8, 2002, at 6 (describing the support for this bill in Congress); Hilzenrath &
Dewar, supra note 21 (detailing the broad support for this bill in both the Senate and
House of Representatives); Tracie Rozhon & Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance Plans of Top
Executives May Violate Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al (detailing congressional
intent with respect to split-dollar life insurance policies); Press Release, Senator Charles
Schumer, Schumer Efforts to Crack Down on Cheating Corporations Pass Senate (July 12,
2002), at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/
PR01082.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (clarifying Senator
Schumer's personal intentions with regard to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Press Release,
Federal Document Clearing House, supra note 22 (quoting House Financial Services
Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley as stating "[t]his legislation, combined with
substantive and far-reaching reforms underway throughout our free markets, will help
restore faith in the system. A strong dose of character, honesty, and ethics in corporate
America wouldn't hurt.").
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officers to secure loans from their companies."33 Senator Charles
Schumer then proposed the prohibition on loans,34 which passed the
House with a vote of 423 to 3 and was unanimously passed in the
Senate.3 1 Such overwhelming support suggests that a single-minded
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in their crusade against
malevolent business.36
With the broad language of the legislation,37 Congress effectively
put an end to personal loans from public corporations that are not
insured depository institutions. 38 The Act limits those covered by the
legislation as:
33. Press Release, The White House Office of Communications, Fact Sheet: A New
Ethic of Corporate Responsibility (July 9, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see Allen, supra note 22 (reporting statements released by White House
Communications Director Dan Bartlett, "These recent abuses of certain types of loans led
the president to believe that the government should draw a bright line concerning loans
going forward. This is one of the main things that undermined the confidence of investors
and shareholders."). Only a week before the proposal, in a speech to Wall Street,
President Bush had called for a ban on corporate loans to executives. President's
Remarks on Corporate Responsibility in New York City, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 1158, 1162;
see also Peltz & Girion, supra note 1, at CI (detailing President George W. Bush's stance
on corporate loans).
34. Hilzenrath & Dewar, supra note 21; Tyler H. Paetkau, Employment Law
Considerations Raised by Post-Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at http://www.law
memo.com/emp/articles/Sarbanes.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("Originally, the Sarbanes bill would have mandated the disclosure
Congress
of loans made by the company to its executive officers and directors ....
designed the loan prohibition to sharply limit the types of hidden compensation that can
be offered to executives without being fully disclosed to shareholders.").
35. 148 CONG. REC. H5480 (daily ed. July 25, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7365 (daily ed.
July 25, 2002); Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Compensation Part I. Sarbanes-Oxley's
Impact on Executive Compensation, Loans, N.Y. L. J., Aug. 30, 2002, at 3.
36. "This legislation ... will help restore faith in the system. A strong dose of
character, honesty, and ethics in corporate America wouldn't hurt." See Press Release,
Federal Document Clearing House, supra note 22 (quoting House Financial Services
Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley). "[F]airness to investors [will] be restored, so we
can get on with the important business of real economic and financial growth." Id.
(quoting Capital Markets Subcommittee Chairman Richard H. Baker). "Time after time,
cheating CEOs received no-interest loans from their companies ... and when the
companies went broke or when the CEOs resigned, the money is often never paid back
... Why do executives ... need to borrow money from their stockholders? Why can't
they go to the bank like everyone else?" Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, supra
note 32 (quoting Senator Schumer). Not all government agencies were in favor of this
legislation, however. See Stephen Fidler et al., Skeptics Say Sarbanes-Oxley Will Create
Litigation Chaos: Unintended Consequences of Reforms Could Be Bad for Business, Says
Andrew Hill, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 22, 2002, at 27 ("The US Chamber of
Commerce was one of the few business lobby groups that maintained open opposition to
some of the reform measures .... [Tihe law was 'hastily drafted, by a variety of different
authors, cobbling together a host of last minute amendments.' ").
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West Supp. 2002).
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an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193439), the securities of which are registered under
section 12 of that Act, or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d), or that files or has filed a registration
statement that has not yet become effective under the
Securities Act of 1933 and that it has not withdrawn."
The statute does not, however, define personal loans. 41 Because
the Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a definition of
personal loans in that legislation could provide guidance. But the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not define personal loans
either. 42 Nor does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act define the phrase "any
director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof). 43 This lack of
guidance is problematic because in the past, Congress and the courts
have given these terms inconsistent definitions.44 For example, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not define an officer, but
defines a director as "any director of a corporation or any person
performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated. '45 The failure of Congress
to more specifically define those actions and individuals covered by

39. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
The term "issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security;
except that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust
certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of
interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of
directors or of the fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the term "issuer"
means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of
depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other agreement
or instrument under which such securities are issued; and except that with respect
to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term "issuer" means the
person by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, used.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2000).
40. Id. § 78j-1(f).
41. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2002).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
43. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A.).
44. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (2002)
(defining an officer as "a president, vice president, secretary, treasury or principal
financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, and any person routinely
performing corresponding functions with respect to any organization whether
incorporated or unincorporated"), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 16a-l(f), 17
C.F.R. § 240-16a-l(f) (2002) (defining an officer as "an issuer's president, principal
financial officer, principal accounting officer ... , any vice-president of the issuer in charge
of a principal business unit, division or function ... , any other officer who performs a
policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions
for the issuer").
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (2000).
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the legislation requires corporations to take particular care until such
time as the government clarifies the details.46
The cashless exercise of stock options ("cashless exercise") is one
corporate practice that Sarbanes-Oxley might prohibit. The practice
involves several steps. First, an option holder, such as a director or
executive officer, must maintain a brokerage account. 47
The
brokerage house must then consent to facilitate the cashless
exercise. 48 At the appropriate time, the broker buys the option stock
at the exercise price. 49 The broker then sells, at the current market
price, a sufficient number of shares to generate adequate funds to

cover the purchase price and to pay the broker's commission." The
broker can pay for the stock by extending a loan to the employee so
that the stock can be paid for immediately, or the company can delay
payment. 1 If the company allows lag time between the exercise of
the option and payment, then the company is technically extending a
loan. The language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits such an
action. 2 If the broker allows the interval between exercise and
payment by funding the stock purchase, the broker is extending a
loan.53 In this latter arrangement, it is the cooperation of the
employer54 that is problematic. These actions on behalf of the
46. Janet L. Conley, New Corporate Regulations: More Work for Less Money,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 27, 2002, at 1 (explaining that specifics of the rule
will go undefined into 2003); see Haynes Boone, Sarbanes-Oxley Prohibition on Loans to
Executives May Conflict with Common Compensation Practices (Aug. 30 2002), at http://
www.haynesboone.com/knowledge/knowledge-detail.asp?groupid=all&page=hottopics&p
ubid=821 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (advising clients of Haynes Boone
that the cashless exercise of stock options "should be carefully evaluated on an individual
basis"); Kilputrick Stockton, Employee Benefits Legal Alert, The Sarbanes-Oxley Loan
Ban-An Update on Benefits Issues (Aug. 2002), at http://www.kilstock.com/site/printl
detail?ArticleId=1112 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (advising that
corporations executing cashless exercises of stock options should proceed with extreme
caution); Lord Bissell & Brook, Client Alert: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Aug. 2002), at
http://www.lordbissell.com/newsstand/Client AlertSarbanes-Oxley.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (counseling clients that "it may be worthwhile reviewing
other services and benefits the company provides to its officers and directors that may be
considered an arrangement for the extension of credit under the Act").
47. Jill Bettner, Stock Options Easier to Use with New Rule, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
1988, at 1 (describing the process of the cashless exercise of stock options).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. This would not be problematic under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act if the corporation
does not arrange for the extension of credit. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp.
2002) (expressly prohibiting the arrangement of credit extensions).
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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employee could constitute an arrangement "for the extension of
credit,"55 and this practice would fall within the scope of prohibited
activity.56
It is possible, however, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission will not interpret the cashless exercise to be a violation
of section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Arguably, it is the
employee, not the corporation, who has a relationship with the
brokerage firm. The employer need not arrange this relationship;
indeed the employer need not even know about it. Under such
circumstances there is no cooperation on the part of the employer.
Further, unless payment in cash is required at the exact moment of
exercise in all situations, the delay would not necessarily be the kind
of loan that Congress is trying to prohibit.57 Because Congress
intended to prohibit those kinds of loans available only to executives
and subject to abuse by these executives,58 a practice that is not
exclusively available to executives would not fall within the scope of
such targeted loans. Thus, this type of cashless exercise is arguably
legal under the Act.
The legal profession is unable to agree on whether cashless
exercises fall within the reach of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Some
lawyers argue that Congress intended to forbid the cashless exercise
of stock options.59 The SEC has not yet issued a release concerning
its interpretation of the Act with respect to cashless exercises. The
American Bar Association recently agreed that corporations should
either suspend the cashless exercise of stock options or exercise
extreme caution until the SEC provides further advice. 6°
Nevertheless, since that time, cashless exercises have occurred.61
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 33-46, infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the
types of loans that Congress wanted to prohibit).
58. See supra note 36 (discussing Congress's objectives in targeting loans).
59. Haynes Boone, supra note 46. Contra Kathy M. Kristof, Interpretation of Law
Could Lead to Ban on Range of Executive Perks Reform: Broad Wording in the SarbanesOxley Act that Bars Loans to Top Brass May Have Unintended Effects, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2002, at C1 (expressing confidence that the SEC will not construe the Act so as to bar
cashless exercises).
60. ABA, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under § 402-Prohibition of
Certain Insider Loans at 8 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
fedsec/materials/sec402issues.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 3, 116 Stat. 745, 749 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 7202 (West Supp. 2002)) (granting the SEC the right to promulgate regulations
consistent with this legislation).
61. Kilpatrick Stockton, supra note 46; see Letter from Clearly, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, to Mr. Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission
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Based on the pervasive use of cashless exercises,6 2 it is unlikely that
Congress was completely unaware of this practice. Regardless of
whether the members of Congress were aware of cashless exercises,
the practice is not explicitly mentioned in either the legislative history
or the text of the statute. Thus, the task of interpreting the Act will
fall to the SEC.63 With time, these conflicting views will be resolved
as the SEC clarifies the meaning of the statute. For the moment,
though, a sensible corporation should either terminate or modify its
cashless exercise practices to avoid violating either the letter or the
spirit of the law.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act should not prove completely
prohibitive to the cashless exercise of stock options for cunning
employees. If a broker is willing to advance the money for the
exercise and the corporation does not arrange the credit, the
transaction would fall outside the scope of the Act.' Additionally, a
three-day grace period could become customary between possession
and payment.65 If this interval is granted to all investors, there should
be no problem if directors and executive officers also take advantage
of the period. A three-day grace period would grant the time needed
for the broker to sell the necessary stock, make payment to the buyer,
and compensate the corporation, effectively bypassing the Act.66
Either of these adaptations would circumvent the provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
Another form of executive compensation in peril is split-dollar
life insurance policies. Corporations have been including split-dollar
policies in executive compensation packages for nearly four decades.6"
(Aug. 15, 2002) (requesting guidance from the SEC with respect to the cashless exercise of
employee stock options), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s73102/clearyl.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Kristof, supra note 59 (stating that
Congress intended to stop the inappropriate use of corporate assets, but it is not clear how
Congress intended to deal with other ancillary issues, such as the cashless exercise of stock
options).
62. Lublin, supra note 1 ("Nearly 14% of 214 major public companies extended credit
for executive officers' stock purchases in 1999, up from 8.4% in 1994 .
(quoting
compensation consultants William M. Mercer, Inc.)).
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 3, 116 Stat. at 749 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7202
(West Supp. 2002)).
64. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
65. See ABA, supra note 60 (explaining that payment for stock is customarily
required either on the date of purchase or three days after the date of purchase).
66. Id.
67. Rozhon & Treaster, supra note 32 ("Albert J. Schiff, the president of the
Association for Advanced Life Underwriters, estimated that over 1,600 public companies
have these policies, which range widely in value."). Split-dollar policies have been used
with increasing frequency since their inception:
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The two major types of split-dollar arrangements are the
endorsement method and the collateral assignment method.6" Under
an endorsement split-dollar arrangement, the corporation owns the
policy and endorses the death benefit to the shareholder, but retains
the right to be reimbursed for the life insurance premiums it paid.69
Under a collateral assignment split-dollar arrangement, the
shareholder owns the policy and assigns it to the corporation as
collateral for the corporation's loan of the insurance premium."
The Internal Revenue Service recently established that collateral
assignment split-dollar life insurance arrangements constitute loans,
while endorsement split-dollar arrangements are not loans.7' This is
significant because, although the IRS has different objectives than the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these regulations represent existing government
interpretations of various forms of these insurance arrangements as
loans where Congress has not stated a specific intent to the contrary.72
A covenant whereby a corporation allows an officer or director to use
its money, free of charge, to pay insurance premiums, falls within the

Thousands of corporations and tax-exempt organizations, including healthcare
organizations, sponsor a split-dollar life insurance plan for one or more key
employees. Since the 1960s, these plans have gained popularity because they
offer an economical way to provide both survivor benefits and a supplemental
retirement income to participants. The tax benefits associated with split-dollar
plans are a driving force behind their popularity.
Thomas L. Ledbetter, IRS Notice 2002-8 Clarifies Split-Dollar Life Insurance
Arrangements, 56 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 58, 58 (2002).

68. See Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,414, 45,414-37
(July 9, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 31) (explaining the various types of splitdollar life insurance policies); Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson, Executive Split
Dollar Arrangements and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at http://www.ffhsj.com/
Symposium Material/GC fall_02/SplitDollar.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
69. Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,416-18 (explaining
the operation of various forms of split-dollar life insurance policies); Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver, & Jacobson, supra note 68.
70. See Ledbetter, supra note 67.
71. Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,414-37 (explaining
the IRS policies with respect to collateral assignment split-dollar life insurance
arrangements); Deborah Walker & A. Thomas Brisendine, Split Dollar Life Insurance,
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Sept.
12-14, 2002 (explaining the complex rules of the instances in which the IRS will classify
split-dollar life insurance policies as loans); see Kilpatrick Stockton, supra note 46;
Offering Split-Dollar Life Insurance to Executives, THE KIPLINGER LETTER, Sept. 27,
2002, at 3 [hereinafter Offering Split-Dollar Life Insurance]; Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver,
& Jacobson, supra note 68.
72. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-32 (1987) (discussing government
agency statutory construction where Congress has not stated a specific intent).
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plain meaning of a "loan,"73 and thus the implied legal meaning of
"loan" under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.74
As no rulings are apparently forthcoming from either Congress
or the SEC,75 corporations are forced to rely on legislative intent to
guide their behavior. The original proponent of this provision,
Senator Charles Schumer,76 stated that he had every intention of
banning these life insurance agreements. 77 All members of Congress
do not, however, concur with Senator Schumer's intent. Senator
Sarbanes7 1 has explained that he never intended to bar these
policies. 79 On the other side of the debate, the insurance industry
argues that because the Act does not explicitly list split-dollar life
insurance polices, Congress did not intend to prohibit them. 0
Although members of Congress do not concur as to their specific
intent with respect to split-dollar insurance, they do concur as to the
general intent of Congress with respect to the Act: Congress was
attempting to bring an end to the abuses of corporate loan-making."'
If the insurance provider contracted with the employer to repay the
premiums plus interest82 from the benefits of the insurance policy to
the employer, the practice would not be subject to abuse. The
employer would be guaranteed a repayment of the loan plus interest
and the employee would still receive insurance as compensation.
73. The statute does not define "loan." Thus, another source must be consulted for
an appropriate definition. See Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999)
(relying on only a dictionary for definition of "discrimination" in federal statute where
that statute did not define the term). The meaning of a loan as regularly understood is:
"An act of lending; a grant of something for temporary use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
942 (7th ed. 1999).
74. The application of this tenet of statutory construction signifies that when
interpreting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, loan means "an act of lending; a grant of something
for temporary use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (7th ed. 1999).
75. Offering Split-Dollar Life Insurance, supra note 71.
76. Senator Schumer is the legislator who proposed the ban on corporate loans to
directors and executive officers. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
77. Rozhon & Treaster, supra note 32.
78. Senator Sarbanes is one of the cosponsors of the bill. 148 CONG. REC. S6684
(daily ed. July 12, 2002).
79. Jeremy Kahn, Suddenly Some Perks Aren't Worth the Pain, FORTUNE, Nov. 11,
2002, at 40.
80. Rozhon & Treaster, supra note 32. It should be noted that section 402 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not enumerate any business practices. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m
(West Supp. 2002).
81. Kristof, supra note 59 (explaining that Congress intended to "stop companies
from using company funds to make huge loans to top executives, which clearly is an
inappropriate use of corporate assets" (quoting Diane Doubleday, principal at Mercer
Human Resource Consulting in San Francisco)).
82. As currently structured, corporations are repaid only the premiums, not the
premiums plus interest. See Rozhon & Treaster, supra note 32.
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Such an arrangement falls within the language of the statute, but it
falls outside of the abuses intended to be prohibited.83 With no
agreement as to the specific intent of Congress or the prudent course
of action, a cautious corporation should suspend such insurance
arrangements pending further clarification.'
There is concern among corporate lawyers about whether those
split-dollar insurance policies established prior to July 30, 2002 fall
within the grandfather clause of the Act so as to be acceptable."
Section 402(k) provides that those "extensions of credit" already in
existence as of the date of enactment are not subject to the
regulations so long as there is no "material modification" to any of
the terms of the loan or the renewal of the line of credit.86 These
existing policies may fall outside the grandfathering provision as soon
as another premium payment is made, as the payment is arguably an
increase in the amount of the loan.87 Under such an interpretation of
the policy, corporations should cease payments of premiums, allowing
the policy to either lapse or be cancelled. Arguably, however, if the
terms of the policy are not changed and if the total sum of the loan
remains constant, no further extension of credit or material
modification has occurred. 8 Thus, there would be no reason either to
modify or cease such arrangements. Until further congressional or
administrative guidance is provided, though, a prudent corporation
would eliminate such policies from their executive compensation
packages.
Compensation packages often include provisions for retirement,
such as a 401(k) plan, whereby the employee contributes part of her
salary to a tax-deferred account.89 Employers establish these plans
for the benefit of their employees and may include a matching feature
83. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. Letter from Carl B. Wilkerson, on behalf of the American Council of Life
Insurers, the Association for Advanced Life Underwriting, and the National Association
of Insurance and Financial Advisors, to Mr. Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Aug. 29, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72202/
cbwilkersonl.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that as there is no
definitive legislative history with respect to section 402, numerous law firms are urging
their clients to use caution with respect to split-dollar insurance arrangements).
85. See Haynes Boone, supra note 46; Lord Bissell & Brook, supra note 46.
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
87. Haynes Boone, supra note 46.
88. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson, supra note 68 (explaining the potential
implications of falling within this grandfathering clause).
89. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings: Types of Retirement
Plans, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining the basic principles of
401(k) retirement plans).
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whereby the employer matches employee contributions to the
account up to a specified limit.90 One of the popular features of these
plans is the ability of the employees to withdraw funds; that is, to
make loans to themselves.9 These loans may fall within the broad
language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Because the employer
establishes the plans, an employee's withdrawal of money from the
401(k) could be construed as the employer's arrangement of "an
extension of credit" 92 to the employee.
Further, the money
borrowed from the account could be traced to the funds contributed
by the employer; as the money must be repaid, this amount would
then be a loan from the employer.9 4 Both arranging an extension of
credit and loaning funds are forbidden under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 95 Because neither Congress nor the SEC has released a
statement concerning their intentions with respect to 401(k) loans,
corporations must again look to the general congressional intent
embodied in the Act.96 Congress wanted to prevent executive officers
and directors from taking loans from their corporations; withdrawing
funds from one's personal 401(k) should not be considered a
corporate loan. The employee is not taking the corporation'smoney,
rather he is borrowing his own money. 97 Further, as most employees
with 401(k) plans are permitted to take loans from their accounts,9 8
this practice is not confined to upper-level management. It is
practically inconceivable that Congress intended to prevent the access
of those entry-level employees in need of emergency funds. Loans
from 401(k) plans are limited in size,9 9 thus this source of funds does

90. Id.
91. Sara Hansard, Confusion over New Law Leads to More Warnings: Now, Hands
off 401(k) Loans, INVESTMENT NEWS, Sept. 16, 2002, at 3 ("Department of Labor rules
limit the loans to the lesser of half of the account's balance or $50,000. But a bigger fear is
that, also under Labor Department rules, loans have to be made on an equal basis to all
plan participants.").
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
93. Hansard, supra note 91 ("'While the employer is not lending the money, it has
arranged for the 401(k) plan and has facilitated the loan,' said Ethan Kra, chief actuary for
Mercer Human Resource Consulting in New York. 'There has been involvement by the
employer .......").
94. Indeed, a failure to repay money borrowed from a personal 401(k) can have
serious consequences. See Why Borrowing from 401(k) Plan Can Be an Unwise Move,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1993, at 6-7.
95. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
96. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
97. See Why Borrowing from 401(k) Plan Can Be an Unwise Move, supra note 94
(discussing employees borrowing from their own vested accounts).
98. See id.
99. See Hansard, supra note 91.
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not constitute a potential supply of gross, unconscionable loans that is
the concern of Congress. 10 0 In any case, though, a very cautious
corporation should discontinue loans from 401(k)s to directors and
executive officers until the government provides further guidance.101
When corporations are recruiting top talent, it is not uncommon
to provide relocation assistance to encourage joining the corporation
or to ease an executive's move.10 2 These relocation assistance
programs are subject to abuse by both new and current executives.
For example, Dennis Kozlowski, former Chairman and CEO of Tyco,
used the company's relocation program to secure $29,756,110 in
interest-free loans to amass an estate in Boca called "The
Sanctuary."103 If the money is not given outright to the executive, the
relocation program is often structured so that the money is repaid at a
favorable rate over a period of time."° ' Sarbanes-Oxley bans grants of
money to executives to be repaid later.1115 This kind of loan is exactly
the kind that Congress intended to ban; that is, the kind of loan that is
not available to all employees and is subject to abuse.1 6 The era of
relocation assistance programs where the money is slowly repaid at a
favorable rate of interest is over. If a corporation is seriously
competing for an executive, such that relocation assistance is
necessitated, the money will have to take the, form of an outright
payment, rather than a relocation loan. These changes are necessary
17
because outright payments do not fall within the scope of the Act,'
whereas grants scheduled for repayment risk violating the Act.
Signing bonuses are another popular technique corporations use
to recruit top executive talent.0 8 Similar to relocation assistance
100. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Jerry Geisel, Loan Ban Sparks 401(k) Worries: Employers Fear
Broad Reading of Corporate Governance Law, Bus. INS., Sept. 23, 2002, at 1 (explaining
the fears of corporate lawyers that the broad language of the statute includes loans from
401(k) accounts).
102. See RE/MAX, Corporate Relocation: Relocation Client Testimonials, at http://
www.remax.com/corpreloc/rtest.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (providing testimonials of several companies that used RE/MAX's
relocation services).
103. Press Release, Canada NewsWire, supra note 13.
104. Kristof, supra note 59.
105. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
106. These kinds of incentives are not offered to other, lower-level employees, so as to
merit special consideration, as an exception, from Congress or the SEC. Kristof, supra
note 59.
107. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (prohibiting personal loans and extensions of credit,
not outright payments).
108. Debra Nussbaum, Earning It: Those Shiny New MBAs Get Signing Bonuses Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at C8.
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programs, signing bonuses are often structured to require repayment
under certain circumstances, such as when an executive leaves the
corporation within a given period. °9 Where repayment is required,
this transaction constitutes a loan. Where the bonus is an outright
bonus payment, not requiring repayment, the compensation does not
constitute a loan. Whether the money is repaid once the employee is
no longer with the corporation does not change the character of such
a transaction; it remains a loan. These transactions are thus illegal
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,11 ° meaning that corporations should
cease these practices immediately, pending further interpretation
from the SEC.
Cessation of signing bonus practices may not be required,
however, if the SEC considers them to be "conditional" bonuses,
conditional on the enumerated stipulations, such as length of
employment. A conditional bonus is less likely to be considered a
prohibited loan under Sarbanes-Oxley. The language of the statute
does not, however, make an exception for conditional gifts that might
constitute loans on certain occasions. Those occasions when a
conditional gift becomes a loan, which may be subject to abuse and
which are not offered to lower-level employees, are the very loans
that Congress intended to prohibit when it resolved to "enhance
investor protection."" I
Unfortunately for the corporations
restructuring their signing bonus programs, when a conditional bonus
becomes a loan remains unclear. Thus, a practical corporation should
suspend these types of signing bonuses immediately to avoid the
penalties of Sarbanes-Oxley. If a corporation wishes to grant a
signing bonus, the bonus should not include conditions requiring
repayment.
If Congress intended to prohibit behaviors that benefited only
the highest levels of management and that were subject to great
abuses, nomenclature should not rule. If the same transactions occur
as outright payments rather than loans, the objectives of the Act have
not been met. It is true that under either name, these benefits are
compensation.
The difference between how corporations will

109. Id.
110. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1).
111. Letter from Todd M. Malan, Executive Director of the Organization for
International Investment, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/tmmalanl.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Todd Malan to
Johnathan Katz].
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approach the two will present issues for the SEC to address for the

future.
Another corporate practice in question is the distribution of
corporate credit cards. On their face, they are not loans because they
are used to pay necessary business expenses and are therefore not
subject to repayment by the executive using the card.' 1 2 Section 402
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might, however, prohibit corporate credit
cards in an instance where the executive accidentally makes a

personal purchase." 3 The corporation would expect to be reimbursed
for the goods purchased; the corporation did not intend to give the
executive a gift and to not require the executive to repay the money
would send a dangerous signal to other corporate employees." 4 Even
if the executive does reimburse, the corporation has temporarily,
albeit unwittingly, made the executive a loan for the amount of the
expenditure. That a loan is made unwittingly does not signify in
determining its illegality. The behavior prohibited by section 402 of

the Act does not require intent,"5 meaning that an unintentional loan
violates the law just as an intentional loan violates the law. When
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, it was attempting to protect
investors from abusive loan-making procedures.'1 6

An astute

corporation should establish a clear policy that prohibits the use of
corporate credit cards for any non-business expense." 7 This would

avoid potential liability under the Act.

if the SEC releases an

interpretation allowing unfettered use of corporate credit cards, the

practice can then be resumed.
Corporate credit cards are not the only way that corporations
allow their executives to finance necessary expenditures.

Cash

112. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reproducing the text of the appropriate
provision of the Act which prohibits personal loans).
113. Conley, supra note 46. There is an exception within the Act for registered brokerdealers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(2). This does not apply here because we are dealing with
the issuance of corporate credit cards by issuers, which is, by definition not a brokerdealer. Id.; id. § 78o (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).
114. The signal is that "accidental" charges on the corporate credit card need not be
repaid to the corporation.
115. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West Supp. 2002).
116. STAFF OF JOINT CONF. COMM., 107TH CONG., CONF. REPORT ON CORPORATE

RESPONSIBILITY LEGISLATION (2002); see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Details Lavish
Lives of Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting that Tyco once paid
Dennis Kozlowski's $80,000 American Express bill for personal purchases). That
Kozlowski had an $80,000 American Express bill illustrates the potential magnitude of
abuses relating to corporate credit cards. However, if large litigation and costly
investigations were to result from the personal use of a credit card to buy a $2 soda at an
airport, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have been taken to absurd levels.
117. Haynes Boone, supra note 46.
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advances also provide a mechanism by which corporations can pay for
an executive's expenses. If the Act is interpreted rigorously, the ban
could work to prohibit advances for executives' travel expenses.118 If
the cash advance covers the exact amount of the expenditure and the
executive does not have the time to take personal advantage of the
extra cash at hand, the executive receives no personal benefit from
the money and does not owe the corporation reimbursement money;
no loan has been dispersed. A problem arises if the cash advance is
for more than the actual expenditure. 1 9 The executive must return
the extra money to the corporation.1 2 Another problem arises if the
employee has the cash advance for a sufficient period of time to
temporarily use the money for personal gain. These transactions are
loans, perhaps the very kind of loans that Congress intended to
prohibit. Congress was trying to prohibit those practices that are
subject to abuse by executive officers and directors; cash advances are
subject to abuse.' 2' Corporate policies should be changed to reflect
the policies of Sarbanes-Oxley. If cash advances are subject to
stringent corporate policy that will prevent the executive from
personally benefiting from the temporary windfall and the money is
immediately returned to the corporate coffers, no abuse will occur;
Congress would have less incentive to legislate against the practice.
Pending further guidance, corporations should amend any liberal
22
policies to advance only the minimum amount of money necessary.
Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply only to domestic corporations; it
applies to all corporations that are registered with the SEC. 123 The
118. Stephen Fidler et al., supra note 36; see Bruce Kelly, Loans Questioned; SEC
Punts on Guidance:
Tough Reform Law Snares Stock Options in New Snafu,
INVESTMENT NEWS, Aug. 26, 2002, at I (discussing the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley for
corporate practices, such as cash advances).
119. Haynes Boone, supra note 46.
120. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (explaining the parallel practice of

non-business charges on a corporate charge card, which is analogous to cash advances in
excess of actual cost).
121. Clare Kermond, Push for Probe on Officer's Card Bills, AGE (Melbourne), Nov.
12, 1998, at 4 (citing one example of an abuse of cash advances totaling $7,000).
122. What happens, however, if the cash advance is for only a few dollars more than
the expenditure? The larger the value of the differential, the more important the cash
advance becomes in the eyes of the investor, the same investor that the Act purports to
protect. See Press Release, Federal Document Clearing House, supra note 22 (discussing
fairness to investors).
123. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k)(1) (West Supp. 2002); id. § 7201(a)(7) (West Supp.
2003); Market Call (CNNfn television broadcast, Aug. 26, 2002) ("The new corporate
governance rules apply to all companies that issue securities here in the [United States],
including those from Europe, Asia and Latin America."); see Janet Whitman, Foreign
Companies Surprised They Must Comply with New U.S. Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 16, 2002, at WL, Associated Press (AP) Newswires-Plus.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to foreign corporations, a fact that has
greatly surprised these companies. 24 In response, hundreds of
international corporations have already begun lobbying against this
extraterritorial application of the Act.
In August 2002, the
Organization for International Investment ("OFII") 126 began
lobbying the SEC to "take prompt action to exempt foreign private
issuers from certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.' 1 27 The OFII
maintains that "these immediately-effective provisions represent an
unfair, unnecessary and highly intrusive interference with the home
country standards applicable to foreign private issuers.' '2 8 Congress
has declared that Sarbanes-Oxley will apply to all corporations,
regardless of home country, registering with the SEC.129 The premise
for the international application of the law is that the international
corporations "are trading their shares in the United States and on
U.S. exchanges and ...American shareholders are their owners ...
the SEC has a responsibility to protect those owners who are

124. Whitman, supra note 123.
125. Fiona Buffini, MultinationalsSeek Exemption from Act, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept.
2, 2002, at 16 ("A letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on behalf of 100
multinationals based in Europe and Asia says the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would have a 'harsh
and dramatic effect' on foreign companies listed on American stock exchanges."); In
Search of Honesty, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2002, at 49 (clarifying the European
Commission's objection to the "extra-territorial impact of the act"); Andrew Parker, US
FraudLaw 'Should Not Hit FTSE 100 Groups,' FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 19, 2002, at 2
(describing the efforts of British companies to gain an exemption from the provisions of
the Act); see also Brazilian Attorneys Say Little Chance of Escaping U.S. Market Law,
GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Aug. 21, 2002 (discussing how those corporations in Brazil

will be affected), available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Mark FentonJones, Firms Assess Impact of US Overhaul, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 23, 2002, at 54
(explaining how the application of the rules will affect Australian corporations); Karen
Howlett, OSC Seeks TSX Rule Review: Wants Governance Guidelines Examined, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 20, 2002, at B1 (noting that 180 Canadian companies
are listed on U.S. exchanges and will therefore be subject to Sarbanes-Oxley); SarbanesOxley Imposes New Rules on Irish PLCs: Executives of Irish Firms with US Regulatory
Obligations Face Stiff Fines if They Fail to Obey New Laws, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at
15 (declaring that Sarbanes-Oxley will inevitably have negative consequences for Irish
corporations registering in the United States); Hugh Williamson, Legal Action Possible
over Sarbanes-Oxley Act, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 12, 2002, at 24 (explaining the
negative implications of the Act for German corporations).
126. The Organization for International Investment is "the leading business association
in the United States representing the interests of U.S. subsidiaries of nearly 100
international companies." Letter from Todd Malan to Johnathan Katz, supra note 111.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The language of the Act indicates intent to apply the Act to issuers, without
regard to home country. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat.
745, 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2002)).
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American citizens.""13 Although the corporate scandals that sparked
this legislation surrounded domestic corporations, Congress wishes to
protect American investors from all corporations, rather than just
those corporations based in the United States.
The result of this extraterritorial application is that foreign
registrants cannot give loans to any executive officer or director,
regardless of where the registrants are based, regardless of the
purpose of the loans. This consequence was intended by Congress, 3 ,
but the legislation is autocratic as it presumes that the United States
has the right and the power to regulate this activity of a foreign

corporation. Congress has a vested interest in protecting the interest
of American investors, but extending that interest so as to apply
Sarbanes-Oxley to all SEC registrants means regulating many of the
world's corporations.'32 This international application means that
Congress is telling the corporations of the world the behaviors that
are permissible and those that are not.

The broad language of Sarbanes-Oxley will have long-lasting
consequences

for

executive

compensation,

consequences

that

Congress may not have fully intended. Congress could not have
intended to hinder insurance policies, 401(k) loans, corporate credit
cards, or cash advances.'33 Rather, the broad language of the Act
includes applications that the President and Congress did not
intend.'34 "[T]he law was 'hastily drafted, by a variety of different
authors, cobbling together a host of last-minute amendments ....
The result ...will be a number of unintended consequences-from
rampant litigation to increased bureaucracy-most of which have the
potential to inflict more harm than good.' 1 35 If Congress had
intended all of these effects, it would have expressed this intent in the

130. Market Call,supra note 123.
131. Whitman, supra note 123.
132. See supra notes 123, 125 (discussing the magnitude of this extra-territorial
application).
'133. See supra notes 67-101,112-22 and accompanying text.
134. "This was a poorly drafted law .... It was thrown together in a hurry by
Congress. The law is such a hodgepodge of different things it was like they tried to give
something to everybody." Bill Deener, CEOs, Attorneys Still Trying to Figure Out New
Certification Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 17, 2002, at 1D (internal quotes
omitted). "President George W. Bush has repeatedly forecast an ideal outcome: new
rules purge corporate America of its past misdeeds, businesses recover confidence and
investors again celebrate the economy's fundamental strengths." Id. That President Bush
is calling for a clean-up of corporate America, including a ban on corporate loans, is ironic
as Mr. Bush accepted loans totaling $180,375 at 5%, a rate below the prime rate, from his
employer, Harken Energy Corp. between 1986 and 1988. Mike Allen, supra note 22.
135. Fidler et. al, supra note 36.
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language of the Act. In interpreting a statute, the legislation should
be interpreted by looking at the law as a whole, the objectives and
policy driving the legislation. 136 Sarbanes-Oxley does not even define
the significant terms of section 402, such as personal loans, executive
officers, directors, or the equivalent of an executive officer or
director.1 37 A failure to define relevant terms is not the hallmark of a
well-drafted, carefully considered statute; such a failure, rather, is
representative of heedless drafting. Protecting American investors'3 8
is a noble aspiration, but Congress far exceeded this objective when it
included large numbers of corporate activities through overly broad
language.
Using this overly broad language, Congress attempted to heal the
ailments of corporate America on July 30, 2002, with the SarbanesOxley Act.139 With this legislation, Congress prohibited public
corporations from extending credit to executive officers or directors,
renewing such credit, or arranging an extension of credit. Apart from
traditional notions of personal loans, 4 ° the expansive language of
Sarbanes-Oxley applies to many other executive compensation
benefits, such as the cashless exercise of stock options and split-dollar
life insurance polices. As time passes, Congress and the SEC must
continue to provide guidance, so that corporations can adapt their
behavior appropriately. Until such guidance is supplied, a prudent
corporation will construe the statute as broadly as possible so as to
avoid the penalties of the statute14 ' and shareholder derivative suits. 42
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136. Dole v. United Steel Workers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (quoting
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987))).
137. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2002).
138. Press Release, Federal Document Clearing House, supra note 22 (discussing
congressional Intent with respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.); 148 CONG. REC. S10563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002).
140. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999).

141. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 1106, 116 Stat. at 810 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78ff (West Supp. 2002).
142. Shareholder derivative suits are suits that are brought by shareholders on behalf
of the corporation alleging illegal behavior on the part of the corporation. BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 455 (7th ed. 1999).

